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COMMERCIALIZATION OF MEDICAID 
SIDNEY D. WATSON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  Today, I am an inner-city doctor working at the Upper Cardozo, 
Community Health Center at 14th and Irving Streets in Washington, D.C., a 
federally assisted, privately run, community-governed medical clinic.  Our 
neighborhood is made up of a large Central American community, a 
Vietnamese enclave, an African-American population scattered throughout the 
region, a mixture of refugees, legal immigrants, and illegal immigrants 
struggling to find someone to treat them despite their lack of money and 
insurance.  I have seen Ethiopians, Somalis, Kurds, West Africans, Chinese, 
Afghanistanis, and Bosnians.  Less than a quarter of our patients have 
Medicaid, almost none have private insurance, and all are poor.  Medical life 
for our patients—like their lives in general—is not easy. 
  The majority of the patients at Cardozo are “self pay”—meaning they have 
no insurance, no money, and can pay little or nothing.  Put differently, if the 
Cardozo health center didn’t continue to receive several million dollars a year 
of federal funding based on the vintage 1960s Office of Economic Opportunity 
idea of a community health center, there would be no payroll, no receptionists, 
no nurses, no doctors, and no medical care.  Grants for the treatment of AIDS 
and the homeless as well as the Women, Infant and Childrens (WIC) Program 
round out the budget at Cardozo.  Government funding remains the operative 
principle of health care finance in our neighborhood.  Without the programs 
legislated and managed by the federal government, there would be no medical 
care at 14th and Irving.  The commercial market hasn’t found our patients and 
doesn’t seem to be looking for them. 
Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan1 
 
* Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law.  A Mercer Law School Faculty Research 
Grant supported this work.  My thanks to the participants in the AALS Annual Meeting Poverty 
Law Program and the Saint Louis University School of Law Health Law Symposium for 
comments on earlier drafts of this work.  I am grateful to Nateesha Gupte and Laura Bedingfield 
for research help. 
 1. Dr. Fitzhugh Mullan, What One Doctor Learned: Going from Policy Making to Caring 
for Real Patients at an Inner-City Clinic, WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1998, at 31. 
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Welcome to the world of welfare medicine: the world of poor people and 
the health care professionals and institutions that serve them.  Dr. Mullan 
paints a graphic and accurate picture of the world of welfare medicine.  Yet, 
the commercial market has found some of welfare medicine’s patients—those 
who have Medicaid.  Today, sixty-four percent of Medicaid enrollees obtain 
care through commercial HMOs—private, for-profit entities.2  This article is 
about the promises and the pitfalls that accompany the commercial market’s 
move into Medicaid and the world of welfare medicine. 
Part II begins by describing the welfare medicine system: who gets welfare 
medicine, who does welfare medicine, and how care for the poor is funded by 
Medicaid and other sources.  Part III traces the recent commercialization of 
Medicaid, the move from a fee-for-service system to one dominated by 
commercial managed care plans.  Part IV exposes the false premises that 
prompted the commercialization of Medicaid, while Part V explores the 
dangers commercialization bodes for the larger world of welfare medicine.  
Part VI returns to the world of welfare medicine, rethinking the role that 
managed care and Medicaid can play in the larger context of welfare medicine. 
II. WHAT IS WELFARE MEDICINE? 
Welfare medicine is the health care system, or non-system, that serves poor 
people.  Welfare medicine is practiced at public hospitals, teaching hospitals, 
and the few private, not-for-profit hospitals that remain in inner cities and other 
places where large numbers of poor people live.  It is care provided by clinics 
and federally qualified health centers staffed by physicians and others with a 
commitment to serve the poor.3  Although not all poor people use welfare 
medicine, most poor people must rely on it for their care. 
Who are the poor people who rely on welfare medicine?  According to the 
federal government, poor people are those who live at or below the federal 
poverty guideline, $8350 for a single person, $11,250 for a couple and $14,150 
for a family of three in the year 2000.4 This includes one of five U.S. children,5 
 
 2. SUZANNE FELT-LISK, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, 
THE CHANGING MEDICAID MANAGED CARE MARKET: TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL PLANS’ 
PARTICIPATION vi (1999), available at http://www.kff.org. 
 3. See Lewis D. Solomon & Tricia Asaro, Community Based Health Care: A Legal and 
Policy Analysis, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 235, 248-60 (1997) (discussing the various entities that 
provide care to poor people). 
 4. Annual Update of the Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines, 65 Fed. Reg. 
7555, 7555-56 (2000). The guidelines for Hawaii and Alaska are slightly higher.  Id. at 7556. 
 5. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 1998 
HIGHLIGHTS 1 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/poverty98/pov98hi.html.  
In 1998, 18.9% of children were poor.  Id. 
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one of ten seniors,6 and one of three persons with a disability.7  Most people 
living in poverty are low-wage workers,8 and a decreasing number are welfare 
recipients.9  While most poor people are white, disproportionate percentages 
are racial and ethnic minorities.  Twenty-six percent of African Americans and 
twenty-five percent of Hispanics are poor compared with only ten percent of 
whites.10  An increasing number of those who rely on welfare medicine are 
recent immigrants.11 
Welfare medicine is a separate, segregated system of care that continues 
despite the enactment of Medicaid, America’s health insurance system for the 
poor.  Proponents of Medicaid envisioned it would end America’s dual system 
of care; one system for poor people and another for those with private 
insurance.12  However, this vision did not come to pass.  Medicaid suffers from 
the same limitations that plague any voucher system, be they health insurance 
vouchers, housing vouchers or school vouchers. 
First, Medicaid rates, particularly physician payment rates, do not compete 
with private insurance and Medicare rates.  Medicaid fee-for-service 
reimbursements average less than fifty percent of private insurance 
 
 6. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1998 B-6 tbl.B-2 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p60-270.pdf. 
 7. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON DISABILITY, SURVEY PROGRAM ON PARTICIPATION AND 
ATTITUDES 3 (2000), available at http://www.nod.org/hs2000.html.  A Harris Survey for the 
National Organization on Disability found that among people of working age, eighteen to sixty-
four, only thirty-two percent with disabilities held full or part-time jobs, compared to eighty-one 
percent of those without disabilities.  It also showed that twenty-nine percent of people with 
disabilities live in poverty (household incomes of $15,000 or less) compared to ten percent of 
people without disabilities.  And people with disabilities are much less likely to live in 
households with incomes of more than $50,000 annually (sixteen percent versus thirty-nine 
percent).  Id.  The full report is available at http://www.nod.org/attitides.html. 
 8. See POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, supra note 6, at 17 tbl.3. 
 9. See MARK GREENBERG, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, LOOKING AHEAD TO 
REAUTHORIZATION OF TANF: SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS 2 (2000), available at 
http://www.clasp.org/pubs/TANF/LookingAheadtoReauthorization.htm (showing welfare 
caseloads are down forty-three percent since Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
was enacted, and fifty percent since the peak caseloads in 1994); Marilyn R. Ellwod & Leighton 
Ku, Welfare and Immigration Reforms: Unintended Side Effects for Medicaid, HEALTH AFF., 
May 1998, at 137 (TANF caseloads dropped twenty-six percent from 1993 to 1997). 
 10. POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, supra note 6, at vi tbl.A. 
 11. See THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, IMMIGRANTS’ 
HEALTH CARE: COVERAGE AND ACCESS fig.18 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org.; see also 
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1998, supra note 6, at ix (discussing poverty rates between 
United States natives and non-natives). 
 12. Rand Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care–The Decline of the Medicaid Cure, 44 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 643, 649-50 (1975); see also ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT ON MEDICAID, 
MEDICAID: TRENDS AND OPTIONS, reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 40,371A, 
at 31,464 (1992); John V. Jacobi, Mission and Markets in Health Care: Protecting Essential 
Community Providers for the Poor, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1431, 1437-40 (1997). 
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payments.13  Nationally, nearly one-quarter of physicians refuse to treat 
Medicaid patients,14 and three-quarters of doctors who see Medicaid patients 
severely limit their Medicaid practice, billing less than $10,000 a year to 
Medicaid.15  A mere 5.5% of Medicaid participating physicians treat thirty-two 
percent of Medicaid patients, while one-quarter of participating physicians 
treat three-quarters of Medicaid patients.16 
Second, the overwhelming majority of health care providers do not live 
and work where poor people live and work.17  Caregiving professionals have 
fled the inner city for areas with good schools, nice houses and fancy malls, to 
avoid neighborhoods with high unemployment, substandard housing, violence 
and poor schools.18  Medicaid helps fund welfare medicine where it is 
practiced, but it has not kept health care providers from fleeing to the 
suburbs.19 
Third, welfare medicine requires a calling, a mission of service.  Poor 
people are sicker than others.20  The stress of low wages, high unemployment, 
substandard housing, violence, and high food costs contribute to physical and 
mental illness, and substance use.21  The stresses of poverty make it harder for 
poor people to cooperate with care regimes.  A special calling is required to 
 
 13. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 352 (1994). 
 14. See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, PHYSICIAN PAYMENT UNDER 
MEDICAID, REPORT TO CONGRESS (1991), reprinted in Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) at 
23 (1991) (noting that 23.7% of physicians do not treat Medicaid patients). 
 15. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, reprinted 
in Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) at 3, 278 (1991). 
 16. Janet B. Mitchell & Jerry Cromwell, Medicaid Mills: Fact or Fiction, HEALTH CARE 
FIN. REV., Summer 1980, at 41.  Janet B. Mitchell & Jerry Cromwell, President’s Comm’n for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Access to 
Private Physicians for Public Patients: Participation in Medicaid and Medicare, in SECURING 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 105, 107 (1982); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, ENSURING QUALITY IN MEDICAID MANAGED CARE 259 
(1993). 
 17. See Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of Black and Hispanic Physicians in Providing 
Health Care for Underserved Populations, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1305, 1306 (1996) (noting that 
poor urban communities with high proportions of African Americans and Hispanics show only 
twenty-four physicians per 100,000 people); Katherine Huang, Graduate Medical Education: The 
Federal Government’s Opportunity to Shape the Nation’s Physician Workforce, 16 YALE J. ON 
REG. 175, 179-80 (1999) (noting that the national average is 190 physicians per 100,000 people). 
 18. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 
175-76 (1999). 
 19. See id. at 175-81. 
 20. Good health correlates primarily with higher socioeconomic status; poor health 
correlates directly with poverty.  Marianne Foley & Glen R. Johnson, Health Care of Blacks in 
American Inner Cities, in HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN BLACK AMERICA: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND 
PROSPECTS 211, 212 (1987). 
 21. See generally Sidney D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City: Asking the Right 
Question, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1647 (1993) (discussing the interaction between race and health care). 
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care for people who have difficulty following instructions and who often miss 
follow-up appointments.  Practicing welfare medicine requires a sense of 
mission to learn to care for those from vastly different racial, ethnic and 
socioeconomic backgrounds.  Some caregivers and institutions are drawn to 
the practice of medicine by this passion; most are not.22 
Welfare medicine cares for those with Medicaid, but it also treats an even 
larger number of people without health insurance.23  Medicaid insures almost 
forty-one million poor and near poor people: children and some parents, 
pregnant women, those who are permanently and totally disabled, and the 
elderly.24  The new state Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) covers 
an additional 1.8 million children.25  Together, Medicaid and CHIP cover 42.8 
million Americans.  However, this number includes only forty-four percent of 
Americans with incomes at or below the federal poverty line.26  An even larger 
number of Americans, forty-four million, eighteen percent of the population, 
remain uninsured.27  In today’s world of welfare medicine, for every Medicaid 
patient there is an uninsured patient. 
Moreover, no clear distinction exists between patients who have Medicaid 
and those who are uninsured.  Today’s Medicaid patient is tomorrow’s 
uninsured.28  Some people, primarily the poor elderly and the severely 
disabled, maintain their Medicaid status for years.  For most people, though, 
Medicaid eligibility comes and goes.  A pregnant woman is eligible for 
Medicaid while she is pregnant, but four months after delivery she is likely to 
be ineligible because income limits for parents are less than a third of those for 
pregnant women and infants.29  A mother with children can get Medicaid while 
 
 22. The same is true in the practice of law where a special cadre of lawyers practice public 
defense in the criminal system and legal services on the civil side. 
 23. The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, 110 HARV. L. REV. 751, 760 
(1997). 
 24. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID 
ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING TRENDS 1 (1999), available at http://www.kff.org/content/ 
archive/2113.2113.pdf.  In 1997, 40.6 million people were enrolled in Medicaid.  Id. 
 25. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, CHIP PROGRAM 
ENROLLMENT: DECEMBER 1998 TO DECEMBER 1999 7 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org. 
 26. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR 
SELECTED POPULATIONS fig.7 (1997), available at http://www.kff.org. 
 27. CATHERINE HOFFMAN & ALAN SCHLOBOHM, UNINSURED IN AMERICA: A CHART BOOK 
10 (2000). 
 28. One year after leaving welfare and Medicaid forty-nine percent of women and twenty-
nine percent of children were uninsured.  Id. at 51. 
 29. Although parents of children are categorically eligible for Medicaid, on average, a 
mother earning more than forty-one percent of the federal poverty line, which was $5802 in 2000, 
makes too much money to qualify.  In contrast, the income guidelines for pregnant women range 
from 133% to 185% of the federal poverty guideline, depending upon the state.  In 2000, a 
pregnant woman in a three-person family would be eligible for Medicaid as long as the family’s 
income falls below $18,820 or $26,178.  See HOFFMAN & SCHLOBOHM, supra note 27, at 48. 
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she is unemployed, but becomes uninsured when she gets a minimum wage job 
without health insurance that puts her, but not the children, over Medicaid’s 
income guidelines.30  Fluidity reigns in a system in which most people who 
lose Medicaid become uninsured.31  Lack of insurance abounds in a system in 
which more than eighty percent of the uninsured are connected to the 
workforce, either as workers or their dependents who are not offered or cannot 
afford employer-provided coverage, but make too much money to qualify for 
Medicaid.32 
Welfare medicine is a system financed almost exclusively by government 
dollars.  Despite the talk about cost-shifting between private insurance and 
welfare care, in reality, most welfare medicine providers have few, if any, 
privately insured patients to whom they can shift costs.33  The government, 
through Medicaid, Medicare, and other programs, shoulders almost half the 
cost of U.S. health care.34  Medicaid, the safety net for poor people, costs the 
federal government over ninety billion dollars a year and the states over 
seventy billion dollars.35  The federal government is the single largest 
purchaser of maternity care, nursing home and other long term care services,36 
and the single most important source of funding for welfare medicine 
caregivers. 
 
 30. See id. at 49 (indicating that in thirty-two states a parent who works full-time for 
minimum wage is not eligible for Medicaid). 
 31. See Bowen Garrett & John Holahan, Health Insurance Coverage After Welfare, HEALTH 
AFF., Jan. 2000, at 175, 177 (noting that forty-one percent of former female welfare recipients 
were uninsured in 1997); see also HOFFMAN & SCHLOBOHM, supra note 27, at 51 (indicating that 
forty-nine percent of women and twenty-nine percent of children were uninsured one year after 
leaving welfare’s Medicaid benefits). 
 32. HOFFMAN & SCHLOBOHM, supra note 27, at 12.  Three quarters of the uninsured are in 
families with at least one full-time worker.  Almost twenty percent are in families with two full-
time workers.  Almost sixty percent of low-wage workers do not have employer based health 
coverage.  Id.  While almost half, forty-five percent, were not offered insurance, thirteen percent 
declined coverage because of cost.  Id. at 46. 
 33. See The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, supra note 23, at 760-61. 
Only twelve percent of public hospital patients have private insurance; at urban community health 
centers 14.3% of patients are privately insured.  Id. at n.84.  See also PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 
ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 33 (1995). 
 34. See LARRY LEVITT & JANET LUNDY, THE KAISER CHANGING HEALTH CARE 
MARKETPLACE PROJECT, TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE 
MARKETPLACE: CHART BOOK 8 (1998), available at http://www.kff.org.  Government programs 
account for 46.7% of national health expenditures.  Id. 
 35. In 1997, the federal cost was $90.8 billion while the state cost was $70.4 billion.  THE 
KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 1 (1999), 
available at http://www.kff.org. 
 36. In 1995, Medicaid paid for thirty-nine percent of the births in the U.S. and financed 
forty-seven percent of nursing home costs and thirty-eight percent of long-term care expenses.  
Id. at 2. 
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In addition to insuring patients, Medicaid and Medicare support welfare 
medicine for the uninsured through reimbursement enhancements.  Medicaid 
and Medicare disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments help support 
institutions that care for large numbers of publicly insured and uninsured 
patients.37  Medicaid and Medicare graduate medical education money, while 
not earmarked for indigent care, help fund the welfare medicine practiced by 
academic medical centers.38  The historic system of cost-based Medicaid 
reimbursement for federally qualified community health clinics was designed 
to support their mission to serve the uninsured.39 
As important as Medicaid is to welfare medicine, a patchwork of federal 
and state programs contribute almost as many dollars.40  A plethora of federal 
block grants provide states with money for child and maternal health, mental 
health care, alcohol and substance abuse, and other specialized health 
programs.41  The federal government funds Ryan White programs to provide 
direct medical care and prescription drugs to people with HIV.42  The federal 
Health Care for the Homeless program pays for outreach and health services to 
homeless people.43  Indian Health Service supports care for Native 
 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(a) (1998); 42 C.F.R. § 412.106 (2000); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(10)(A)(ii)(XIII) (1998); see generally TERESA A. COGHLIN & DAVID LISKA, THE 
URBAN INSTITUTE, THE MEDICAID DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENT PROGRAM: 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1 (1997) (discussing DSH payments), available at 
http://www.urban.org. 
 38. See RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
528-42 (1997). 
 39. Solomon & Asaro, supra note 3, at 265-67. 
 40. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. 
 41. For a partial listing of federal block grant funds, see Federal Money Retriever, Federal 
Government Funding: Maternal and Child Health, at http://www.fedmoney.com/grants/ 
su0159.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2000). 
 42. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
381, 104 Stat. 576 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300ff (Supp. II 1990)).  Title II of 
the act provides funding to states to provide HIV care to uninsured, underinsured and low-income 
people living with HIV.  In 1999, services provided through the CARE Act reached about 
400,000 individuals.  About $6.4 billion has been appropriated for the CARE Act since its 
inception.  Almost $965.5 million of this amount has been allocated to ADAP funds to allow 
states to purchase HIV treatment drugs.  HIV and AIDS: US DHHS Funds Ryan White Act (June 
20, 1999), at http://www.hivandhepatitis.com/hiv/rnhiv6_20_99_04.htm. 
 43. In 1987, Congress enacted Title VI of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance 
Act, authorizing grants for the provision of health care to homeless individuals.  Stewart B. 
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11301 (1988)).  In 1998, grants were awarded to 128 community-based 
organizations that, in turn, expanded their service network through arrangements with over 300 
health care providers.  In that year, the HCH programs served more than 430,000 clients 
nationwide. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, HEALTH CARE AT HOMELESSNESS 2 
(1999), at http://nch.ari.net/health.html. 
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Americans.44  The Veterans Health Administration offers inpatient, outpatient, 
respite and long term care services to poor veterans.45  Public mental health 
systems, both inpatient and outpatient services, are primarily funded by state 
dollars.46  State and local grants and tax dollars support public hospitals, public 
clinics and private not-for-profit providers that treat the uninsured.47  
Government funding for this hodge-podge of programs comprises 12.8% of 
national health expenditures, compared to 14.3% spent on Medicaid.48 
While the numbers help illustrate the size and scope of welfare medicine, 
they cannot paint the human picture.  Community health clinics, like Dr. 
Mullan’s Cardozo Community Health Center in Washington, D.C., have a long 
tradition of compassionate, high quality care.49  Other government funded 
welfare medicine programs offer inspiring models of medical care at its best.50  
Throughout the country, concerned, committed and highly skilled caregivers 
work in welfare medicine.51 
However, welfare medicine can also be dysfunctional.  Welfare medicine 
breaks down when the community clinic does not have evening hours or an 
after-hours phone line, and the hospital, which runs the clinic and receives over 
seventeen million dollars a year for indigent care, garnishes the minimum 
wage salary of a young mother who forgot, in the midst of a nighttime medical 
crisis, to bring her two year old son’s Medicaid card with her to the emergency 
 
 44. See Indian Health Service Internet Home Page, http://www.ihs.gov (last modified Sept. 
8, 2000). 
 45. See VETERANS BENEFITS AND SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 
GATEWAY TO VA HEALTH CARE 1, at http://www.va.gov/vbs/health/index.htm (last modified 
July 28, 2000). 
 46. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT 
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 4 (1999), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ 
mentalhealth/chapter6/sec2.html. 
 47. See JACK A. MEYER ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE ROLE OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN FINANCING SAFETY NET HOSPITALS: HOUSTON, OAKLAND, AND MIAMI 9-10 
(1999), available at http://www.urban.org (quantifying local support to public hospitals in three 
communities); see also The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, supra note 23, 
at 761 (indicating that in 1991, nearly eighteen percent of public hospital revenues came from 
local government subsidies). 
 48. LEVITT & LUNDY, supra note 34, at 8.  See also The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care 
on the Uninsured, supra note 23, at 762 (thirty-five percent of the funding for community health 
centers comes from government and foundation grants). 
 49. SARA ROSENBAUM & ANNE DIEVLER, A LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE COMMUNITY 
AND MIGRANT HEALTH CENTER PROGRAMS 12-13, 35 (1992), available at http://gwis.circ.gwu. 
edu/~chsrp/rp.html. 
 50. See, e.g., PEDRO JOSE GREEG, JR., WAKING UP IN AMERICAN 180-89 (1999); see also 
Howard Larkin, Community Care Gets Competitive, 40 AM. MED. NEWS 7, 7-9 (1997) 
(describing the example of the 16th Street Community Health Center in Milwaukee). 
 51. See, e.g., DAVID HILKIKER, NOT ALL OF USE ARE SAINTS: A DOCTOR’S JOURNEY WITH 
THE POOR 1 (1994). 
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room.52  Welfare medicine is myopic when Medicaid pays for nursing home 
care for a forty-seven year old woman with cerebral palsy, but will not cover 
the cost of the attendant care that would allow her to live in the community.53  
Welfare medicine fails when Medicaid pays for psychiatric hospitalizations to 
save a homeless woman diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia when she 
crashes, but will not reimburse the services of an Assertive Community 
Treatment Team, an interdisciplinary outreach team, that can provide the 
psychiatric, social and medical services needed to help her remain stable and 
become housed.54 
This is welfare medicine, health care for poor people, both its 
accomplishments and its shortcomings.  At its core, welfare medicine remains 
a segregated system funded by state and federal money.  Medicaid pays for 
much of welfare medicine, but a patchwork of other government programs 
play a significant role as do federal, state and local tax subsidies.  However, 
changes in Medicaid are affecting all of welfare medicine. 
III. COMMERCIALIZATION OF MEDICAID 
Medicaid has changed.  What was once a fee-for-service system financed 
with government dollars and delivered by public and private not-for-profit 
institutions has morphed into a managed care system dominated by for-profit 
entities.  Forty-eight states use managed care for at least some Medicaid 
recipients, only rural Alaska and Wyoming have no recipients enrolled in 
managed care.55  Nationwide, fifty-four percent of Medicaid recipients are 
enrolled in managed care, up from less than ten percent in 1991.56  Twelve 
states have more than seventy-five percent of their Medicaid enrollees in 
managed care.57  Sixty-four percent of Medicaid enrollees receive managed 
care in commercial Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).58 
Medicaid managed care is accomplished in two ways.  Some states use 
primary care case management systems (PCCM) to match beneficiaries with 
 
 52. Confidential memorandum from Sidney Watson, to the File 1 (May 8, 1999) (on file 
with the Saint Louis University Law Journal). 
 53. Debbie Rhyne, Looking For a Home: Mary Hicks is Going to Court to Get Out of a 
Nursing Home, THE MACON TELEGRAPH, July 30, 2000, at A1. 
 54. See Sidney D. Watson, Discharges to the Streets: Hospitals and Homelessness, 19 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (on file with author). 
 55. MARSHA REGENSTEIN & STEPHANIE E. ANTHONY, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, MEDICAID 
MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 3 (1998), available at http://www.urban.org. 
 56. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND MANAGED 
CARE fig.1 (1999), available at http://www.kff.org (noting that in 1998, 53.6% of Medicaid 
enrollees were in managed care compare with 9.5% in 1991). 
 57. Marsha Gold & Anna Aizer, Growing An Industry: How Managed is TennCare’s 
Managed Care?, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 2000, at 86. 
 58. FELT-LISK, supra note 2, at 17. 
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primary care physicians who coordinate the patient’s care and serve as 
gatekeepers to specialty and inpatient services.59  These PCCM gatekeepers are 
generally paid a monthly case management fee with all other services paid on a 
fee-for-service basis.60  Most states, though, contract with managed care 
organizations (MCOs) paying them a monthly capitation payment on behalf of 
each enrollee to provide a specified package of benefits.61 
States rushed into Medicaid managed care primarily for financial reasons.  
First, and foremost, states saw Medicaid managed care as a cost containment 
strategy.62  Managed care’s rhetoric of competition and cost-effectiveness 
promised to do what state policy makers had been unable to do, stop the 
growth in Medicaid spending by using “the market as the toughest regulator.”  
Moreover, capitated Medicaid managed care shifts the risk of Medicaid cost 
increases from state budgets to the managed care contractor. 
States also rushed into commercial Medicaid managed care because the 
commercial HMOs came calling.  For years, the private HMO industry 
shunned Medicaid because it was unprofitable: reimbursement was low, and, 
as long as enrollment was voluntary, few Medicaid recipients opted for 
managed care.63  However, in the early 1990s, the Clinton administration 
began granting waivers of federal Medicaid freedom of choice requirements so 
states could force Medicaid recipients into managed care.64  Since 1997, the 
Balanced Budget Act allows states to require most Medicaid enrollees to 
participate in managed care without obtaining federal approval.65  With almost 
eleven percent of the U.S. population enrolled in Medicaid, commercial HMOs 
saw a better business opportunity.66 
 
 59. REGENSTEIN & ANTHONY, supra note 55, at 3. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id.; John Holahan et al., Medicaid Managed Care in Thirteen States, HEALTH AFF. 
May 1998, at 43, 51 (two-thirds of Medicaid managed care enrollees are in risk-bearing MCOs). 
 62. Id. at 45. 
 63. Holahan, supra note 61, at 52; see generally ROSENBLATT, supra note 12. 
 64. See Colleen A. Foley, The Doctor Will See You Now: Medicaid Managed Care and 
Indigent Children, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 93, 99, 116, 121 (1997); see also Sidney D. Watson, 
Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty and Physician Self-Interest, 11 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 191, 203-04 (1995) (discusssing the story of Tennessee’s Medicaid waiver); Vernellia 
Randall et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers: Critiquing the State Applications, 26 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1069 (1996) (reviewing and comparing state Medicaid waivers granted by the 
Clinton administration). 
 65. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 489 (1997) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1397u-2 (Supp. IV 1998)).  The BBA allows states to make managed care mandatory 
without a federal waiver except for those who are eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare and 
children with special needs.  The BBA also mandates requirements for managed care enrollment 
procedures and choice of plans.  It also requires that states establish Medicaid managed care 
access standards and procedures for monitoring quality and appropriateness of care.  Id. 
 66. Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 52. 
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Moreover, the timing was right for commercial Medicaid managed care 
because managed care was exploding in the private sector.  Insurance 
companies like Cigna, Aetna and Blue Cross/Blue Shield were organizing for-
profit HMOs to take advantage of new managed care opportunities in the 
private sector.  These commercial, for-profit HMOs now dominate the private 
HMO market, accounting for sixty-three percent of enrollees and seventy-five 
percent of plans.67  They have the administrative infrastructure to operate 
managed care systems.  Expanding into the growing Medicaid managed care 
field seemed like a promising business opportunity. 
Using commercial HMOs to deliver Medicaid services coincides with two 
important trends: a societal trend to privatize government services, and a health 
care trend toward corporatization.  Throughout government, a move is afoot to 
use private contractors to provide services traditionally offered by public 
schools, prisons and the cash welfare system.68  Medicaid has always relied on 
private institutions and caregivers to deliver medical services.  Medicaid has 
even used private corporations, like Ross Perot’s Electronic Data Systems 
(EDS) for utilization review and claims processing.69  It is an easy next step to 
draw private actors into designing Medicaid’s delivery system and to morph 
from fee-for-service Medicaid into managed care. 
In addition, health care is becoming corporatized.  Public hospitals are 
closing or converting to private status.70  Many communities have seen their 
not-for-profit hospitals become for-profit entities.71  Commercial insurers and 
HMOs dominate the insurance and managed care fields, and even Blue 
 
 67. Sylvia Fubini, 2000 Industry Outlook, HEALTHCARE TRENDS REP., Jan. 2000, at 7-8. 
 68. See generally Barbara Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor into Gold: How Corporations Seek 
to Profit from Welfare Reform, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 1997, at 44. 
 69. See, e.g., STATE OF GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH, DIVISION OF 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDER MANUALS 1-2 pt.1 (n.d.).  In Georgia, a number of different 
private entities handle various administrative functions for Medicaid.  Electronic Data Systems 
(EDS), a for-profit corporation, provides claims processing, provider enrollment, prior approval 
for some services, and determines eligibility for nursing home services.  A different corporation, 
First Health Services, handles prior approvals and other functions related to pharmaceuticals. Yet 
another private entity, Georgia Medical Care Foundation, handles prior approval of physician 
services.  Yet other private entities have responsibility for peer review and utilization review.  See 
id. at 13. 
 70. See generally Phyllis E. Bernard, Privatization of Rural Public Hospitals: Implications 
for Access and Indigent Care, 47 MERCER L. REV. 991 (1996) (discussing various corporate 
models for restructuring public hospitals); THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUBLIC HOSPITALS–A 
PRESCRIPTION FOR SURVIVAL 1 (1996), at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/minority/siegelbf.as. 
 71. See generally Gary J. Young & Kamal R. Desai, Nonprofit Hospital Conversions and 
Community Benefits: New Evidence from Three States, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 1999, at 146 
(discussing the conversion of nonprofit hospitals that come under the control of a for-profit 
company); Jack Needleman et al., Hospital Conversion Trends, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 1997 at 187 
(presenting information on the extent, geographic distribution, and other issues related to hospital 
conversions). 
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Cross/Blue Shield has become a for-profit firm.72  The stampede to corporate 
status even includes doctors who are more and more likely to be employees or 
shareholders of increasingly large group practices.73 
Not only was the time right for commercial HMOs to enter Medicaid, 
Medicaid managed care, particularly when delivered by commercial HMOs, 
offers exciting possibilities.  Commercial HMOs offer the allure of finally 
achieving the single-tier health care system that the original proponents of 
Medicaid sought: one managed care plan for both privately insured people and 
those with Medicaid.  Commercial managed care also offers a vehicle to 
overcome the chronic deficiencies of Medicaid.  Medicaid enrollees have faced 
persistent problems in accessing primary care.  Commercial HMOs offer to 
link Medicaid recipients with a physician or other primary care provider who 
can provide ongoing preventive and primary services.74  Many Medicaid 
recipients and their advocates hailed managed care as a cure for what ails 
Medicaid.75 
The result of this confluence of events is that commercial managed care 
now dominates Medicaid.  For-profit HMOs serve six million of the 9.3 
million people in Medicaid managed care, sixty-four percent of enrollees.76  
Commercial HMOs have arrived and Medicaid has changed. 
IV. FALSE PREMISES AND FALSE PROMISES 
Although commercial HMOs are now a mainstay of Medicaid managed 
care, the courting ritual between states and commercial entities is fraught with 
rose colored glasses, flirtation and even tomfoolery.  At bottom, the 
commercialization of Medicaid is based on false premises that doom the 
experiment for failure. 
First, Medicaid managed care cannot deliver the cost savings that states 
expect.  As Sarah Rosenbaum says: “The Medicaid managed care revolution 
responded to a phantom problem.”77  In the early and mid 1990s, states were 
reeling from explosive Medicaid cost increases.  From 1988 to 1993, Medicaid 
 
 72. See, e.g., Fubini, supra note 67, at 7 (stating that for profit HMOs account for 64.2% of 
all HMO enrollment). 
 73. See id. at 13 (noting that the size of physician practices has increased significantly in the 
past thirty years). 
 74. James W. Fossett & Frank J. Thompson, Back-Off Not Backlash in Medicaid Managed 
Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1159, 1161 (1999). 
 75. See Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 44-46; see generally Watson, supra note 64. 
 76. FELT-LISK, supra note 2, at 17. 
 77. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, Address at the Saint Louis University Health 
Law Symposium (Mar. 31, 2000) (transcript available with the Saint Louis University Law 
Journal). 
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costs grew almost twenty percent per year.78  From 1993 to 1995, the growth 
slowed, but still averaged nine to ten percent annually.79  States are desperate 
to put the brakes on, but these cost increases cannot be controlled by managed 
care techniques. 
Two factors primarily contributed to the staggering growth in Medicaid 
costs.  One, eligibility expansions substantially increased the size of Medicaid 
rolls.80  Two, much of the rest of the growth resulted from clever state 
manipulation of reimbursement rules for payments to disproportionate share 
hospitals and the shifting of state mental health and mental retardation costs to 
Medicaid.81  Altering service delivery patterns via managed care cannot 
reverse these cost increases.  Cost increases can, and have been, halted by 
drops in Medicaid eligibility and reductions in disproportionate share 
funding.82 
Second, Medicaid is not a program with a great deal of fat.  Medicaid fee-
for-service reimbursement rates average less than half that of private insurance 
rates.83  Medicaid’s administrative overhead is less than five percent.84  Such a 
lean program leaves little room, if any, for further cost reductions.  Estimates 
indicate that managed care may, at best, reduce Medicaid costs by five to ten 
percent.85 
Even if Medicaid managed care can reduce the costs of services per 
enrollee, overall program costs are unlikely to show significant savings 
because the groups being enrolled—parents and children—use relatively few 
services.  Although parents and children make up almost seventy-five percent 
of Medicaid enrollees, they use only twenty-five percent of Medicaid 
services.86  Even if Medicaid managed care can produce a five to ten percent 
 
 78. MEDICAID: A PRIMER, supra note 35, at 5.  Between 1988 and 1993, Medicaid spending 
grew at an average annual rate of 19.6%.  Id. 
 79. MEDICAID ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING TRENDS, supra note 24, at 2. 
 80. Fossett & Thompson, supra note 74, at 1160. 
 81. Id.; John Holahan  & David Liska, The Slowdown in Medicaid Spending Growth: Will it 
Continue?, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 1997, at 157-58. 
 82. See id. at 157; BRIAN BRUEN & JOHN HOLAHAN, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, SLOW 
GROWTH IN MEDICAID SPENDING CONTINUES IN 1997 1, 4 (1999), available at www.urban.org/ 
health/slow_growth_medicaid.pdf. 
 83. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 84. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 725 
(1997).  Administrative overhead is 5.5% in large group markets and twenty-five percent in small 
group markets.  This means that overhead is similar between Medicaid and similarly sized 
programs.  Id. 
 85. Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 46. 
 86. THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE MEDICAID 
PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, at 1 fig.1 (1999) (parents and children comprise seventy-three percent 
of enrollees and use 25.1% of expenditures), available at http://www.kff.org. Their average 
yearly per enrollee cost is only $741 for children and $1874 for parents.  In contrast, the aged use 
on average $10,804 per year, and those with disabilities use $8841 a year.  Id. 
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savings, which many doubt, as long as enrollment efforts focus on parents and 
children, the overall program savings will be an uninspiring 1.2 to 2.5%.87  A 
savings, but no panacea either. 
Third, managed care theory, saving money by using preventive medicine 
and well care rather than paying for expensive high end care after people get 
sick, does not work with Medicaid because of its byzantine eligibility criteria.  
It is impossible to use Medicaid services to prevent people from getting sick 
when childless adults only qualify for Medicaid after they are “permanently 
and totally disabled.”88  Under Medicaid rules, a person with HIV or any other 
progressive or chronic disease cannot qualify to get the drugs that will keep her 
healthy and in the workforce.89  Medicaid is available only after people are too 
sick to work and need acute or end stage care. 
Moreover, many Medicaid enrollees move on and off Medicaid rolls 
making continuity of care and preventive care impossible.  Nearly half of 
Medicaid enrollees lose their coverage within one year and seventy percent are 
out of the program within two years.90  In a study of California and Florida’s 
Medicaid programs, one-quarter to one-third of enrollees left Medicaid during 
the year.91  Another seven to ten percent went off Medicaid and returned 
during the year, a phenomenon called churning.92  Some people lose Medicaid 
eligibility because they begin earning too much money.  Others, like pregnant 
women, no longer fit into one of Medicaid’s categorical eligibility 
pigeonholes.  Whatever the reason, most Medicaid enrollees who lose 
Medicaid become uninsured.93  When the commercial HMO only serves 
Medicaid and privately insured patients, the newly uninsured patient is out of 
luck.  She has no ongoing source of care and must begin navigating the welfare 
system of care, public hospitals and public clinics, to find someone who will 
treat her. 
Fourth, commercial HMOs have no experience practicing welfare 
medicine. Cigna, Aetna, Blue Cross/Blue Shield and other commercial HMOs 
have built a track record providing services to large employer groups.  
Commercial health care, the brand the middle class receives, does not work 
 
 87. See Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 46. 
 88. To qualify for Medicaid, adults must either be “permanently and totally disabled” or 
caretaker parents.  Most adults on Medicaid qualify because of their status as a parent or other 
caretaker.  MEDICAID: A PRIMER, supra note 35, at 3. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Arnold M. Epstein, Medicaid Managed Care and High Quality Can We Have Both?, 278 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1617, 1621 (1997). 
 91. MARILYN R. ELLWOOD & KIMBALL LEWIS, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, ON AND OFF 
MEDICAID: ENROLLMENT PATTERNS FOR CALIFORNIA AND FLORIDA IN 1995 2 (1999), available 
at http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/occa27.pdf. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Epstein, supra note 90, at 1621. 
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well for poor people.  Commercial HMOs provide a fairly standard set of 
medical benefits: inpatient and outpatient care, and prescription drugs.  They 
set up daytime office hours with telephone numbers for after-hours service and 
assume that enrollees can take care of the rest of their lives.  People with 
private insurance tend to have houses, stable jobs, and support from family, 
friends and co-workers.  Many poor people, though, do not have jobs, housing, 
telephones, reliable transportation or support networks. 
Commercial HMOs simply do not know how to practice and administer 
welfare medicine.  They do not have systems for helping a homeless man who, 
after having his life saved by $30,000 to $40,000 of ICU treatment, no longer 
needs acute care hospital services, but has no place to go upon discharge but to 
the street.94  Commercial insurers have no experience creating networks to 
treat a woman with diabetes who needs insulin but does not have a refrigerator 
in which to keep it.  Commercial HMOs are set up to deliver a discrete set of 
medical benefits.  They do not have experience in the world of welfare 
medicine, which requires integrating medical and social services. 
Moreover, commercial HMOs have little, if any, experience treating the 
elderly and disabled who, although they make up only about twenty-five 
percent of Medicaid recipients, use sixty-five percent of Medicaid services.95  
These enrollees include people with AIDS, children with mental retardation 
and developmental disabilities, people with severe mental illness and others 
with chronic alcohol and substance abuse problems.96  Commercial HMOs 
have little experience with these diseases and the specialized providers who 
treat them.97  Commercial HMOs focus on acute care services.  The elderly and 
those with disabilities need more long-term care: nursing home care, home 
health services and mental health treatment.98 
In addition, commercial HMOs are unlikely to have providers in their 
networks that practice where welfare patients seek care.  Commercial HMOs 
 
 94. See LISBETH B. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF 
DISADVANTAGE 137 (1988). 
 95. THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, supra note 86, at 1 fig.1.  The elderly comprise 
10.1% of Medicaid enrollees.  Those with disabilities account for 16.8%.  Id.  However, the 
elderly use 27.6% of expenditures while the disabilities use 37.5%.  Id. 
 96. See MARSHA REGENSTEIN & STEPHANIE E. ANTHONY, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, 
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 2 (1998), available at 
http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/occa11.pdf; see also Foley, supra note 64, at 128-29 
(discussing the problems of disabled children and others). 
 97. See, e.g., John A. Flippen, The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment 
Program and Managed Medicaid Mental Health Care: The Need to Reevaluate the EPSDT in the 
Managed Care Era, 50 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1997) (discussing the special needs of people with 
mental illness and special service package Medicaid provides for children). 
 98. Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 49, 63 n.22.  Medicaid has covered services not offered 
by most commercial plans, including substance abuse treatment, mental health care, 
rehabilitation, home and personal care, and case management.  Id. 
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market to employers who are likely to have enrollees who live in suburbs and 
exurbs where few poor people live.  Commercial HMOs create networks of 
primary physicians who are easily accessible to enrollees.  These practitioners, 
like their patients, live beyond the neighborhoods with high concentrations of 
Medicaid patients.  Geographically, these HMO network providers are unlikely 
to practice welfare medicine. 
Finally, it is becoming clearer that commercial entities may not be willing 
to stay in the Medicaid managed care market for the long haul.  A few years 
ago, the commercial HMOs came to Medicaid managed care in droves; now 
they are leaving in droves.99  One-third of states have seen commercial HMOs 
withdraw from the Medicaid market.100  Aetna has left New York and 
Connecticut.101  Utah cannot find a commercial HMO to bid on Medicaid.102  
New York City’s Medicaid program has only five commercial HMOs left,103 
and in the Bronx only one commercial Medicaid HMO remains.104  Ohio has 
only one commercial HMO serving its Medicaid enrollees.105  In Tennessee, 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the state’s largest Medicaid contractor, renegotiated its 
TennCare contract so it is no longer a full risk-bearing HMO.106 
As commercial HMOs abandon the Medicaid ship, often the only Medicaid 
managed care entities left behind are welfare HMOs: HMOs whose members 
have Medicaid, Medicare, or other government coverage, rather than private 
insurance.107  Today, the fastest growing category of Medicaid managed care is 
the “Medicaid only” plan, one in which seventy-five percent or more of 
 
 99. See Leigh Page, More Commercial Plans Leave Medicaid, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 23-
30, 1999, at 13.  See also THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, 
MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE fig.4 (1999), available at http://www.kff.org; FELT-LISK, supra 
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 100. Commercial Insurers Shun Medicaid Market: Is it a Bailout or a Shakeout?  Nobody’s 
Sure—Yet, ST. HEALTH WATCH, Nov. 1998, at 1, 4. 
 101. Id. at 1. 
 102. Id. at 4. 
 103. Id. 
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 105. Amy Goldstein, Managed-Care Medicaid Experiment Fails in Ohio, WASH. POST, Aug. 
14, 1999, at A8. 
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HEALTH WATCH, Feb. 2000, at 1. 
 107. For example, in the Bronx Health Plan, Medicaid covers eighty percent of its members 
and other government programs cover twenty percent.  A Most Dangerous Game, supra note 104, 
at 3. 
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enrollees are Medicaid recipients.108  Over forty percent of Medicaid managed 
care enrollees are in “Medicaid only” plans.109  From 1992 to 1996, the 
percentage of welfare HMOs participating in Medicaid managed care grew 
from eleven to eighteen percent.110 
At a minimum, the exodus of commercial HMOs and the emergence of 
welfare HMOs dash hopes that Medicaid managed care will mainstream those 
on Medicaid.  Welfare HMOs return Medicaid recipients to the segregated 
world of welfare medicine.  Segregated care may have its advantages.  Many 
welfare HMOs have networks of long time safety net providers with enviable 
records of providing quality care based upon their knowledge of welfare 
medicine. They have a cadre of committed providers and long-term experience 
providing care to poor people.  This background means that many welfare 
HMOs have the three characteristics that appear most important in predicting 
successful Medicaid HMO performance: competence, commitment and 
stability.111 However, welfare HMOs create other risks. 
Many welfare HMOs are organized, sponsored and financed by traditional 
safety net providers, public and private not-for-profit hospitals and clinics who 
historically practiced welfare medicine.112  These institutional providers have 
always struggled with low Medicaid reimbursement rates and the need to cover 
the costs of caring for the uninsured.  Now though, Medicaid managed care has 
forced them to become risk bearers as well.  As welfare HMOs they are 
reimbursed by Medicaid on a per enrollee capitation rate that, generally, does 
not take into account that their other welfare patients, often half their patient 
load, are uninsured.113 
Welfare HMOs risk insolvency and communities risk losing their welfare 
medicine system.  In 1997, seventy percent of welfare HMOs lost money, 
while only eleven percent showed a profit.114  In contrast, forty-three percent 
of commercial HMOs enrolled in Medicaid made money, even though fifty-
 
 108. Fossett & Thompson, supra note 74, at 1165. 
 109. Id. 
 110. A Most Dangerous Game, supra note 104, at 3.  In 1992 10.8% of Medicaid MCOs were 
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 112. See Holahan et al., supra note 61, at 58. 
 113. See text accompanying notes 23-27, 41-48. 
 114. A Most Dangerous Game, supra note 104, at 3. 
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seven percent showed a loss.115  Although it is too early to predict how welfare 
HMOs will fare financially, the warning signs signal caution.116 
Examination of commercial Medicaid managed care reveals false 
promises.  Medicaid managed care is unlikely to dramatically lower costs.  
Without substantial guidance and training, commercial HMOs are unlikely to 
know enough about welfare medicine to improve the quality of care for the 
poor.  Moreover, the experiment is dangerous.  The influx and outflow of 
commercial HMOs are likely to harm patients who end up floundering from 
one system to the next.  The entrance and exit of commercial HMOs is also 
likely to leave traditional welfare providers in an even more precarious 
financial position than they were when fee-for-service Medicaid populated the 
world.  Medicaid enrollees are likely to be drawn through a short period of 
commercial Medicaid managed care only to find themselves dropped back into 
an even more distinctly two-tiered medical care system than the one which 
existed before the advent of commercial Medicaid HMOs. 
V. RETHINKING WELFARE MEDICINE 
Transplanting commercial HMOs into Medicaid does not cure what ails 
Medicaid and welfare medicine.  Commercial HMOs are unlikely to have the 
networks or the know-how to deliver the specialized medical and social care 
that welfare medicine requires.  However, the graver danger posed by the 
commercialization of Medicaid is that by focusing too narrowly on 
transplanting commercial HMOs into Medicaid, we have lost an opportunity to 
think creatively about welfare medicine and Medicaid and managed care’s role 
in it. 
Managed care is fast becoming the curse word of medicine, yet managed 
care methodology, or what might more accurately be termed “managing care,” 
has much to offer Medicaid and welfare medicine.  The term “managed care” 
refers to many different organizational arrangements,117 but is often popularly 
associated with systems of overzealous cost cutting.  However, managed care 
when done responsibly, offers to integrate the financing and delivery of 
welfare medicine care.  MCOs contract to create systems of care.  The MCO 
agrees to furnish the enrollee with a specific package of services and providers 
to deliver those services for a preset fee, usually a capitation rate or a global 
budget.118 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. See generally SUZANNE FELT-LISK, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLES OF MEDICAID-DOMINATED MANAGED CARE 
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dominated plans in thirteen states) 
 117. Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A 
Literature Analysis, 271 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1512, 1512 (1994). 
 118. Id. 
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Under this contractual system, managed care offers possibilities for what 
ails welfare medicine and Medicaid.  The historic fee-for-service Medicaid 
system is often dysfunctional.  It pays providers to treat people after they get 
sick rather than keeping them well.  It fails to attract sufficient physicians.  It 
encourages a welfare medicine system that relies too heavily on hospital 
emergency rooms and outpatient clinics that provide episodic care.  It often 
does not cover the types of care the aged and people with disabilities most 
need and want, like home health services and community based mental health 
care. 
Managed care creates the framework to begin reconstructing welfare 
medicine.  Managed care promises to move care out of the emergency room, 
where continuity of care and an ongoing provider-patient relationship is 
impossible, and to match enrollees with a primary care provider who will help 
the patient get preventive care to stay well or, for those with chronic or severe 
illness, to live as full and functional a life as possible.  Capitated or global 
payments can relieve welfare medicine and Medicaid from the financial 
constraints of a medical insurance model.  Managed care creates a financial 
structure capable of providing poor people, particularly the elderly and those 
with disabilities, with the mix of medical and social services they need to lead 
healthier, more productive lives. 
Programs that incorporate capitated payments have shown enormous 
potential for improving welfare medicine and Medicaid.  In Baltimore, a 
special capitated mental health network serves homeless, mentally ill people.  
It provides mental health services, case management and housing.  The 
program has proved that it can keep people well and help them return to work 
at a lower cost than the old Medicaid fee-for-service rate.119  Another 
Baltimore program for pregnant substance-abusing women combines intensive 
peer group support and obstetrical care.120  The program costs less than fee-for-
service Medicaid, and results in a better life for mother and child.121 
However, for managed care theory to work for welfare medicine, poor 
people need to be able to settle into managed care systems to get the benefits of 
a “stay healthy” approach.  Preventive care is unlikely, as long as people rotate 
from Medicaid managed care to the world of the uninsured and untreated.  
Moreover, welfare medicine providers’ financial stability will remain 
precarious as long as half their patients are “self-pays.” 
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One option for reconstructing welfare medicine into a system that can take 
advantage of what managed care has to offer is to expand insurance coverage 
to provide more people with Medicaid, private health insurance and state-
funded alternatives, thereby reducing the number of uninsured patients.122  
States have increased flexibility to expand Medicaid eligibility without seeking 
federal waivers.  States may now offer Medicaid to working parents with 
incomes approaching 150% of the federal poverty line.123  Also, they may offer 
Medicaid to disabled people with incomes up to 250% of the federal poverty 
line.124  The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) offers states 
federal matching funding to insure children in households with incomes up to 
200% of the federal poverty guideline through Medicaid or a separate 
insurance program.125  An increase in the number of insured patients means 
more financial stability for safety net providers.  Expanded insurance coverage 
also means that more people can be enrolled in MCOs or other systems that 
focus on preventive and long-term care as well as acute care.  Tennessee, 
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Hawaii, Minnesota and Oregon are each experimenting with different ways of 
accomplishing this goal.126 
As a compliment to expanded coverage, another option is to pool large 
numbers of Medicaid enrollees, preferably but not necessarily, with privately 
insured patients and to funnel these patients to managed care entities that agree 
to serve the uninsured as well as insured patients.  Such a “tie-in” assures that 
Medicaid patients will remain in the same system of care if they lose their 
Medicaid coverage.  Pooling these patients allows states to direct their non-
Medicaid state and federal discretionary health spending to these new-style 
safety net MCOs to help cover the cost of care for the uninsured. 
Creating large pools of Medicaid enrollees, with or without privately 
insured enrollees, makes good use of managed care theory.  First, it allows for 
continuity of care as people rotate from Medicaid to uninsured status.  Second, 
creating larger pools of patients makes the pooled enrollees more attractive to 
HMOs.  Commercial insurers shunned Medicaid when only a few patients 
enrolled.  When enrollment became mandatory and the number of potential 
patients grew, commercial HMOs became more interested.  Third, the larger 
the pool the easier it is to average costs between high use and low use patients.  
Finally, larger pools allow for economies of size and scale.  A number of states 
are limiting the number of Medicaid MCOs and authorizing special need 
MCOs to create economies of scale and ensure continuity of care. 
For example, in some areas California has limited Medicaid HMOs to one 
per county while contracting with these welfare HMOs to provide other non-
Medicaid welfare medical care services.127  These HMOs are county-organized 
health systems (COHS), entities created by state statute and authorized by 
several Medicaid waivers.128  The results are especially promising in Santa 
Barbara County where the Santa Barbara Regional Health Authority HMO has 
been called, “Medicaid in paradise; paradise in Medicaid.”129  The Authority 
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consistently reports stellar clinical outcomes.  One reason for the Authority’s 
success is its large enrollment base: it covers virtually everyone who has 
Medicaid, it is the sole county provider for prenatal care, and it is one of four 
SCHIP providers in the county.130  With a large, solid funding base the 
Authority can focus on preventive services and continuity of care. 
Kentucky has gone one step further and designated its traditional welfare 
medicine providers: public hospitals, teaching hospitals, and community 
clinics, as the state’s only Medicaid HMOs.131  The state has sole-source 
Medicaid contracts with HMOs organized by the state’s traditional safety net 
providers.132  While the lack of choice of networks raises potential risks, sole 
sourcing provides a stable funding base for traditional welfare medicine 
providers and assures continuity of care for those who have always relied on 
the welfare medicine system.  Sole sourcing should also free money for 
services and higher capitation rates that would otherwise be spent for 
marketing and other administrative expenses.133 
Massachusetts successfully uses sole-source welfare HMO contracting.  
The state relies on a single HMO, the Massachusetts Behavioral Health 
Partnership, to deliver mental health services to Medicaid enrollees and the 
uninsured who, in the past, depended on the state’s public mental health 
system.134  The state, the Partnership, and consumer advocates have worked 
together to develop access, quality and outcome standards.  The contract is 
renewed annually allowing all parties the opportunity to examine the 
Partnership’s performance and to fine-tune and improve the delivery system to 
better meet the needs of its patients.135 
Delivering better welfare medicine requires that HMOs be able to meet the 
unique needs of those who rely most extensively on welfare medicine: the 
elderly, those with physical and mental disabilities, people with chronic health 
problems, those with spinal and head trauma, premature babies, and children 
with special needs.  In the past, Medicaid and other welfare medicine programs 
have been hindered in helping these groups by restrictive and often illogical 
benefit packages. 
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A shift to managed care, with capitated payments or global budgets, offers 
an opportunity to alter and expand services to better meet the complex needs of 
low income people, particularly the elderly and the disabled.  It also offers the 
ability to combine Medicaid funding with funding for targeted health services, 
special education, housing and rehabilitation services to provide expanded and 
more integrated services.  The challenge is to stop thinking about Medicaid 
managed care as merely a different way to fund medicine as usual.  Instead, we 
need to think creatively about how to pool funding sources to create new, more 
responsive systems of care and benefit packages. 
For example, the Missouri Interdepartmental Initiative for Children with 
Severe Needs integrates the financing and delivery of community and home-
based services for children with severe behavioral health needs who are at risk 
of institutionalization, regardless of their eligibility for Medicaid.136  
Historically, these children bounced around trying to patch together services 
provided by six different divisions of state government.  The Initiative 
combines funding from each of these agencies, including Medicaid, into a 
single capitated payment of $3199 per month per child, which is paid to the 
Missouri Alliance for Children and Families, a for-profit corporation created 
by ten community and residential care providers.137  The Alliance is 
responsible for creating a network of medical and service providers.  Case 
managers, the key to the system, work with children and their families to direct 
the delivery of comprehensive, integrated services.  Although the system is not 
expected to save money, the capitation rate is set to be budget neutral.  The 
hope is that services will shift from out-of-home residential settings to less 
intensive settings, including the family home.138 
Similarly, Iowa has combined Medicaid money with state and federal 
mental health and substance abuse funds to create a Medicaid behavioral health 
system that successfully integrates mental health and substance abuse services 
and offers a broad array of previously uncovered services.139  The Iowa Plan 
provides mental health and substance abuse coverage to approximately 
180,000 residents, approximately eighty-five percent of those eligible for 
Medicaid, using a single contractor, Merit Behavioral Care of Iowa, a for-
profit corporation.140  Operated under a Medicaid Section 1115 waiver, the 
system must be budget-neutral in its use of federal Medicaid funds, a goal the 
state accomplished by combining Medicaid with other state and federal funds 
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targeted for mental health and substance abuse treatment.141  Commentators 
conclude that Iowa’s behavioral health system has succeeded where others 
have faltered because state officials had a clear vision of what they wanted, 
worked closely with consumers, providers and the managed care contractor, 
and proceeded slowly in building the system.142 
Of course, for all its promise, managed care, with its capitated payments 
and global budgets, carries the risk of under-service and cost-cutting to make 
money.  These risks become even more likely when states limit the number of 
Medicaid and welfare HMOs or use sole-source contracting.  The problems 
that privately insured workers report, including delays and refusals of care and 
treatment, are even more likely to occur in Medicaid and welfare capitated 
systems where patients are less sophisticated consumers and less aggressive 
advocates for their care.  Medicaid and welfare managed care enrollees need 
the same legal protections as privately insured workers: the right to dispute 
care denials and a right to proceed against the HMO when services are denied. 
One powerful way to guard against the risk of MCO cost cutting is the use 
of performance criteria: financial penalties and bonuses tied to meeting 
specific access standards, service requirements and outcome measures.  For 
example, in Kentucky, Medicaid HMOs get a one percent bonus for meeting 
outcome measures like birth weight and immunizations.143  Iowa’s behavioral 
managed care contract requires sixty performance standards, ten of which have 
financial penalties or incentives attached.144  In Massachusetts, the mental 
health HMO gets a financial bonus if it implements an Assertive Community 
Treatment Team, an interdisciplinary team that takes mental health and social 
services to hard to reach chronically mentally ill patients in the community and 
that has been shown to be the most effective treatment modality for those who 
are homeless or at risk of homelessness.145 
Performance standards allow states to identify the services and outcomes 
they want and to use financial incentives, rather than expensive law suits or 
protracted administrative wrangling, to get them.  Performance standards are 
particularly appropriate in the managed care context which is founded on the 
concept of using financial incentives to encourage preventive care and to 
change old, ingrained patterns of service delivery.  It helps MCOs and 
providers think about systems of care rather than discrete services. 
Yet, the biggest lesson to be learned from state experience with 
commercial Medicaid managed care is to move slowly and to assure 
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contractors understand their responsibilities, networks are in place, and 
enrollees understand the system.  Detailed contracts that help everyone 
understand the system and its obligations can help with this educational 
process.  States like Iowa that have taken time to work closely with 
commercial HMOs report success.146  Others, like New York, which have 
moved precipitously, report horror stories.147 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As long as neighborhoods are economically and racially segregated, 
welfare medicine is likely to be an inevitable part of our health care system.  
Quick fixes for Medicaid, including the wholesale commercialization of 
Medicaid via commercial HMOs, are doomed to failure if they lose sight of 
Medicaid’s role within the welfare medicine world.  We need to remember that 
Medicaid is only one part of a larger world of welfare medicine. 
By focusing on a long-term relationship with primary care providers, 
managed care offers much to cure what ails welfare medicine.  Likewise, 
capitated payments and global budgets offer financial incentives to move 
welfare care away from acute, episodic service to preventive care.  Tying large 
numbers of Medicaid patients into substantial purchasing pools and combining 
Medicaid funds with other government funding for health, social services and 
housing offers the opportunity to expand services to better meet the needs of 
welfare medicine patients.  The challenge is to begin thinking of welfare 
medicine as a sub-specialty and a unique system of care. 
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